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that Are Applicable  to
the Soviet  Union?
Odin Knudsen"
Introduction
Although  there are considerable  differences  between  Poland  and she
Soviet  Union,  the similarities of the policy  decisions  faced  by each make
the Polish  experience applicable  to the Soviet Union.  This  chapter
focuses  on the role  of agriculture in the transition, and the problems
faced by the sector in the reform process.  The effect  of the stabilization
program on agriculture in Poland was  expected  to be  positive  as  real
exchange  rate devaluation and liberalized  prices were  anticipated to boost
incentives  to  the sector.  However,  uncertainty and the oligopsony
structure of agriculture stymied  the expected  beneficial  effects.
Nevertheless,  the Polish experience  still points  to recommending  full-scale
liberalization  in the  Soviet Union  along  with a strict macrostabilization
program.  Under such  a reform, privatization of agro-industry and land
must  come  soon  after the initiation of macrostabilization and price
liberalization.
*  Division  Chief, Agriculture Operations Division,  Maghreb,  North African Region,  The
World  Bank.
1  The world is changing  at such a  rapid pace that it is hard to know what  to call  any
country.  Between  writting and publishing  this article, the Soviet  Union  has become  the
Former Soviet Union.  The issues  and problems discussed  are still very  real today if
somewhat  more complex  because  of the breakup into separate republics.
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without precedent.  From centrally controlled  economies of varying
degrees,  these  countries are embarking on the greatest economic  and
political  transition of modern times.  Economists  and policymakers  have
few  lessons  or guidelines  to assist these nations  in making the transition.
Experience  and theory have been focused  more on  the end points, how
planned versus market economies  function,  than on  the actual transition
from one  to the other.  Complicating the understanding of the transition
is the  heterogeneity of countries embarking on the reforms  and the
different starting points,  from rigidly controlled  economies  such as in the
Soviet  Union to  more mixed economies  such as in Hungary.  Lessons--
even when tentative and frail--from the early stages  of reforms must be
gathered and offered  to other countries to  help  guide their transitions.
In this chapter, I will  describe the early stages  of the transition in Poland,
emphasizing  the agricultural sector and using these experiences  to draw
some  lessons  for a similar but much later transition beginning  in the
Soviet Union.  In some ways,  this comparison may be strange because
Poland and the Soviet  Union have many dissimilarities.  But, as  I will
attempt to demonstrate,  the parallels are also  remarkable.
Themnost  evident  difference  between  the countries  are in their size  and
political  makeup.  Although,  estimates in international currencies  for the
Soviet  Union and Poland are only  approximate, the gross  national
product (GNP)  of the Soviet Union is about $500  billion and that of
Poland is roughly $70 billion, according  to the International Monetary
Fund.  Population sizes  are about in the same  proportion as  GNP, 290
million  in the Soviet  Union and about 40 million  in Poland.  Thus, per
capita incomes  are roughly  equal.  The  Soviet  Union  has  been dominated
by Communist rule for about 70 years with  the population having few
contacts with the West.  Although in Poland communism  was imposed by
the outside  for about 40 years, the Polish people  had more access  to the
West.  Furthermore, the Soviet  Union is more  diverse  politically,
consisting  of 15 dispersed  Republics  with many ethnic groups.  In
contrast, Poland  is more unified politically and has  only minor  pockets of
ethnic populations.
The agricultural sectors in both countries  are also  different.  In the Soviet
Union, agriculture contributes  about 25 percent  of GDP, using about 20
percent of the workforce.  In Poland, agriculture is  much smaller,
contributing  only 12 percent  of GDP but with about 25  percent of the
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structure of production  is also different, with about 97 percent of the
producing area in state or collective  farms in the Soviet Union and only
about 20-25 percent  in Poland.  Furthermore,  the private  landholdings  in
the Soviet Union are tiny, only about a half a  hectare, while  in Poland
land is held in small to medium-size  holdings averaging  6-7 hectares.
There are also institutional differences  between Soviet and Polish
agriculture.  Although both governments  had state orders for supplying
planned agricultural  output from state farms, the Polish authorities
relied more on price as an inducement  for production  because of the
larger private farm sector.  Poland also had a long tradition  of
cooperatives  handling marketing and some processing  although this
tended to be dominated by the nomenclature.  In the Soviet Union, the
state handled  all state orders  and procurement  with only small quantities
entering private channels.
Although  there are substantial  differences,  there are also  considerable
similarities in the two countries' starting points in the reform process.  In
the initial stages, both face difficult  macroeconomic  situations, both  have
highly distorted  relative prices, and both had state-controlled trade and
even internal commerce.  Furthermore,  in both cases, agro-industry and
processing  are in the hands of the state and, while  the state farms  in
Poland hold a smaller proportion of the total land, both countries  must
deal with state landownership  to get agricultural  growth (in Poland,  the
state farms produce  most of the marketable  surplus of grains).  Also, both
countries  have difficult housing problems that limit mobility of labor.
Finally, any adjustment in either country must deal with the safety net for
millions of displaced workers and low or fixed  income families.
These similarities in at least the policy decisions  that their governments
face make the Polish experience  at least somewhat  applicable  to the
Soviet conditions.  Furthermore, Poland's  dramatic stabilization  steps and
the severe effect  on output  are often stated as reasons that a similarly
striking step would not be possible  in the Soviet Union.  Yet the
international  task force of the International  Monetary  Fund (IMF),
International  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  (IBRD),
European  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  (EBRD), and
Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Development  OECD)
essentially  recommended  rapid and comparable dramatic steps  for the
Soviet Union but with certain  modifications  derived  at least in part from
the lessons  of the Polish experience  (Konovalov,  1991).  How could they
recommend  similar steps when  in some respects  the Polish  reforms  are
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this chapter, I explore why  the Polish case  does  indeed lead  to a
conclusion  that rapid adjustment will  also be  needed for the Soviet
Union.  I begin  by describing the Polish case,  derive  some  general lessons
from it, and then apply them to the Soviet  case.
Poland's Macroeconomic  Crisis and Stabilization
The government that took power in September  1989 faced  an extremely
difficult  economic  situation.  Inflation was  accelerating  at triple-digit
rates, fueled  in part by a massive  budget  deficit equal to 8 percent of
GDP.  External debt amounted  to 80 percent of GDP; debt servicing
equaled five times export earnings.  Growth had stagnated with per capita
income  now  lying below  1978 levels  while  government  expenditures had
grown  by over 30 percent in real terms in the last  decade.
Complicating  the macroeconomic  situation was  the structure of the
economy.  Over 70 percent of the industrial sector was  owned  by the
state.  Exports were  canalized  by a few  large enterprises that had survived
on massive export subsidies.  But even more critical was the nature of
decisionmaking  in these  firms.  In 1981, the Polish parliament gave  wide
powers  to the workers' councils,  among  them the power to hire and fire
management.  Management and labor had merged  into an explicit
collusion,  with  the government, the  nominal owners  of capital, having lost
control of costs  and production yet retaining the ultimate obligation  to
fund the losses  of these  enterprises.  Because  of large subsidies  to state
enterprises and a substantial fall in revenues,  the fiscal  deficit reached  29
percent  of budget expenditures  in the first half of 1989.
The  government  had then inherited in the  fall of  1989 an essentially
bankrupt economy,  unable to service  its debt, a  macroeconomic  freefall,
and a state sector outside  of its control.  It had few  options.  Over 40
years of  Communist rule had culminated  in a rigid economic  structure
and in macroeconomic  ruin.
The new government decided to  launch a  critical two-pronged  attack on
the unstable  economy.  In the first part of this strategy, the government
attempted to gain  control over the budget  and prepare for the next phase
by making some  institutional and legal  changes,  mainly introducing
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1990, the second  phase of the program was  launched.  The crux of this
phase of the government's  program was a standard IMF-type stabilization
package:  fiscal  and monetary restraints, a wage  freeze,  and a massive
devaluation  followed  by a fixed  nominal exchange  rate to  serve  as a
nominal anchor.  The stabilization package  was  designed  to bring down
inflation rapidly and to put pressure on inefficient  state enterprises.  With
budgetary constraints in place,  the government  expected  that the market
would select  inefficient state enterprises  for bankruptcy and initiate the
rationalization of the state sector.  Unemployment  was  expected  to rise,
but this could be viewed  as a sign of the success  of the process;
enterprises would  be shedding  excess  labor and improving control  over its
wage  bill.  With improvement in efficiency  and reduced costs,  the cost-
push part of inflation would be brought under control.  Following
macroeconomic  stability,  the real adjustments in the economy  were
expected  to follow  through a gradual process  of enterprise restructuring.
Agriculture's role in this stabilization program was  envisaged  to be
threefold.  First, it was expected  to respond rapidly to the new  incentives.
Agriculture,  largely a private sector, was  expected  to  follow  the incentives
of higher relative  prices and deliver  food to  urban areas at prices closer
to world prices.  Although higher food  prices would  mean  falls  in real
wages,  these  drops would  be moderated by the increased  availability of
both greater quantities and varieties  of food.  Furthermore, the hidden
costs  of food--waiting  in long  queues--would  be eliminated.  Second,
agriculture was  expected  to boost  exports,  easing  pressure on the balance
of payments.  Although export  subsidies were eliminated,  policymakers
expected that about 80 percent of  remaining exports would be  competitive
at world prices.  Furthermore, the devaluation  of the real exchange  rate
would  compensate  for the loss  of export subsidies.  And finally,
agriculture would  hold back rural-to-urban migration and perhaps absorb
some of the  unemployed  from the industrial sector.  With about 50
percent of the small  farm population being part-time farmers employed  in
local state enterprises, a more prosperous  agricultural sector  was  expected
to  absorb some of these displaced  workers.
The Actual Outcome  of the Stabilization
By most macroeconomic  indicators, the stabilization program was a great
success.  Inflation  crumbled under the stringent monetary and fiscal
restraints  from a monthly  rate of 79 percent  in January, to 24  percent in
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increased  revenues  (from several  reforms on enterprise taxation)
produced a budgetary surplus, projected to be between  1 and 3  percent of
GDP.  Monthly interest rates followed  the decline  in inflation,
undershooting inflation in January but becoming  real and positive  in
February by 14-16 percent and falling to  1-4 percent in May.  The massive
devaluation of January of about  100 percent (compared with the
December rate) held, zlotys  became  readily convertible  in Poland,  and
foreign exchange  reserves expanded.  Driving  the foreign exchange
accumulation was a contraction in imports and a rapid expansion  of
exports  (imports fell  by 27 percent, and exports expanded  by 14.5  percent
from convertible  currency areas in the first 5 months of 1990).
But, there were  also  signs of trouble.  Real wages  fell by 40 percent  in the
first quarter of 1990.  Output declined  by 30 percent in the socialized
sector (29 percent below its level  in May  1989).2  Food expenditures  rose
from about 39 percent to 55  percent of total expenditures  (compared  with
the first 4 months of 1989),  reflecting the  immediate pressure of food
price rises on household real income.  Unemployment,  however,  did not
increase as expected.  By  the end of April, unemployment  stood at only 2
percent of the labor force.  Only a  few firms had declared bankruptcy.
Nevertheless,  real debt increased  rapidly by  12 percent in March, 18
percent in April, and 3 percent in May.  Also, there were various  reports
of delayed  payments between  firms.  The restructuring program
apparently had not hit the state enterprises; labor was  largely  being
retained, and enterprises were somehow  holding on despite the magnitude
of the macroeconomic  adjustment.
The signs  of problems with the macroeconomic  program were  most
evident in the agricultural sector where  the greatest successes  were  hoped
to have come.  The very  strengths of the agricultural sector that were  to
lead to its success--its  largely  private nature and its ability to respond
quickly to incentives--rapidly  mirrored the difficulties  facing  the
macroeconomic  adjustment program.  Agriculture was  unable to achieve
stability and a supply  response through macroeconomic  policies  when the
real structure of the economy  remained distorted and economically
concentrated.
2 These numbers may overstate  the severity  of the fall as  production in the private sector
is not recorded.
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Agriculture in Poland is a small  sector,  contributing only about  12
percent of GDP.  Thus, agriculture would seem  most likely  to be affected
by the economic  program but would not in turn influence  the programs'
success.  But this expectation  is turning out not to be the case.  The effect
of the economic  program is straightforward.  With the domestic market
consuming  about 87 percent of agricultural production, one could  expect
that the macroeconomic  program and the resulting sharp recession  to
significantly  affect  the market for farm products and hence  the sector's
economic  well-being.  But agriculture also has strong feedbacks  to the
general economy  through employment  (28 percent of the workforce)  and
by affecting  the real wage  rate (food  expenditures  range from 35 to over
50 percent of all expenditures depending  on income  class).  Furthermore,
about 20 percent of industrial output comes  from agro-industries, which
in turn depend on domestic agriculture for 90 percent of their raw
material.  The agricultural sector is, thus, more  important to the economy
than its economic  size would  indicate.
When the economic  program began,  the agricultural sector  was  highly
protected and subsidized.  From 1986 to  1989,  food  subsidies  were 3.4  to
4.8 percent of GDP.  Although  part of this subsidy was  nominally  for
consumption,  it was  in part brought  about by high producer  prices.  For
example,  producer prices  for wheat  during the late  1980's ranged from  10
to over 30 percent above  equivalent border prices.  For the state sector
which  produced most of the marketed wheat,  the price support was  even
higher, averaging about 50-60 percent  greater than world prices.  The
producer support was  nearly equally  generous,  from 24 to 50 percent
above  world prices  depending on the year.  As with wheat, the support
was  concentrated in the state sector.  This support through output prices
was  supplemented by input subsidies  for fertilizers, pesticides,  and animal
feed  at about  1 percent of GDP.  Credit subsidies  also  were provided to
the agricultural sector.  Furthermore, export  subsidies  were given  for
certain commodities  at a rate often  half the value  of the goods  exported.
Aggregating these  subsidies  for the  different crops results in what  is
referred to as the producer subsidy equivalent  (PSE)  or the total income
supplement  offered  farmers and the state farm sector.  In the state sector
for wheat,  this PSE constituted  nearly 70  percent of the value  of the
wheat produced; for rye,  about 50 to  70 percent; for sugar, about 50
percent; for rapeseed, about.40  to 50 percent; for pork, about 40 percent;
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and processing on  a per unit value basis was  about at the level  of many
industrial economies.  Agriculture,  especially  the state sector, was
sheltered and heavily  subsidized.  In 1988, average  farmers' income
exceeded  that of urban workers by 17 percent  (compare this figure with
Hungary and Yugoslavia  where farmers' incomes  are below  those of
urban workers by 4 percent and 20 percent). 4
The subsidies  ended abruptly with the macro-stabilization  program and
the reduction of state expenditures.  Food subsidies  fell  from about 4
percent of GDP in 1989 to less  than a budgeted 0.2 percent for  1990.
Agricultural input subsidies declined  from  1.3  percent of  GDP in 1989  to
0.3 percent in  1990.  Furthermore, credit subsidies  and export subsidies
were nearly eliminated.  In less  than a year, a once  highly supported
agricultural sector (with support  near Western  European standards) had
been released  to survive  in a deeply  recessionary  economy,  still struggling
to establish  a market economy.s
The devalued  exchange  rate should have  partly compensated  for this near
elimination  of direct subsidies.  The real exchange  rate (the  nominal
exchange  rate corrected for inflation)  fell by nearly 50 percent  compared
with its  1989 level.  If this devaluation had been transmitted to farmgate
prices, then the net effect  would  have  been a much  more neutral
adjustment in producer support.
But the price transmission did not occur in part because  of deliberate
government  policies  and in part because  of economic  concentration in
agro-industry.  With inflation  running rampant,  the cooperative  structure
s  Some  caution should be exercised  in interpreting PSE  numbers for Poland  as the
exchange  rate is a  confounding  factor.  However,  if estimates  of the  real exchange  rate from
the World Bank  and IMF are used to correct the PSE numbers, then the level  of
subsidization  actually  increases  for 1987  and 1988 because  these estimates  point to  an
undervalued  exchange  rate (compared with 1980)  for those years.  During 1982-85,  the
exchange  rate was overvalued  (compared with 1980);  subsidies  helped  to compensate  for this
overvaluation  in those years.
SHowever,  in  the first quarter of 1990,  farmer's income  was 86  percent of other workers'
income.
SThis  dilemma  is most evident in  the dairy sector where  subsidies  reached nearly $1
billion in  1988, fell  to $70 million in 1989, and nearly disappeared  in 1990.  The dairy sector
contributes 19 percent of agricultural GDP and provides  an important source of  cash to over
1  million  small  farmers.
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producer prices, farmers withheld  grains from the market in early and
mid-1989  (for the first 9 months of 1989, agricultural supplies to cities
were reportedly  down by 30 percent).  The specter of a food  shortage in
urban areas created a deep  concern  to the government.  Exports of
essential  foodstuffs were prohibited and  food aid urgently procured.  With
the blockage of exports, the arrival of food aid, and the sales  of farmers
to the milling  industry increasing  (because  of the cooling down of
inflation and rising interest rates), scarcity quickly turned to abundance.
Exacerbating the situation was  the decline  in domestic  food consumption
brought about by rising retail food  prices and declines  in real income.
Stocks of grains and milk products accumulated,  and farmgate prices
plunged.  Because  of low demand for agricultural inputs, animal feeds  and
fertilizer sales  also sharply declined.
Further aggravating the fall was  the behavior of the agro-industry sector.
Although the grain industry (the grain monopoly was broken  up into  41
separate companies)  and the  milk industry seem  to be quite fragmented
and competitive,  at the local  level they are highly concentrated.  Years of
accumulated collusive  behavior (encouraged  by past governments  to  meet
the objectives  of a state coordinated sector)  continued  after prices were
liberalized and most subsidies  removed.  The breakup of national
monopolies  created local  monopolies,  and a system of cost-plus  pricing
continued.  Instead of lowering prices  to encourage  sales,  agro-industry
restricted  throughput, raised selling  prices, and forced back on producers
(through lower purchase prices) most of the industry's  higher  per unit
operating costs.  Wheat  prices fell to 60 percent of the border price,
oilseeds  to 80 percent,  pork to 70 percent of its export  price, and cattle
for slaughter to 59 percent of its  f.o.b. export  price.  The ratio  of flour to
wheat prices rose from about 3 to  1 on January  1, 1990, to 6 to  1 by the
end of June  1990.  Heavy government  support to agriculture  had turned
to indirect taxation through export controls,  food aid, and oligopsony
behavior.
The government,  recognizing the rapidly deepening  farm crisis,  released
the ban  on most agricultural exports  except  grains, where it remained
bound  by its  food aid agreements  to prevent  reexport.  For butter given
as food aid, the government  canceled  its request seeking  the substitution
of feed  corn.  But the crisis was now deeply imbedded  in the sector.
Meanwhile,  the flush season  for milk began,  and the grain harvest began
to loom  on  the late summer and fall  horizon.  High nominal  and real
interest rates made  stockholding  extremely expensive,  adding to the
indebtness  of agro-industry.  Dairy cooperatives,  the potato industry, feed
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particularly hard hit.  Farmers and some  state farms, fleeing  high interest
rates and debt, quickly  sold off durable goods  and farm implements.
Most  dairy farmers received  only  extremely  low  and delayed  (sometimes
for months)  payments for their milk.  Agriculture, the only  largely private
sector  in Poland,  had been brought to its knees.  But to rescue agriculture
through subsidies  meant the opening of the floodgate  of subsidies
elsewhere  in the economy  as the austerity program began  to take hold  in
other state sectors.  In a collective  consciousness,  state  managers  seemed
to be contemplating  the day of restitution of their state enterprises by the
government.  Macroeconomic  stability was  being threatened by the
problems  of a relatively  minor sector (in  terms of GDP),  agriculture.
The  Structural Roots  of the Polish  Farm Crisis
In the  1980's, the government's vision of agriculture was  based on  income
parity and self-sufficiency.  Farmers should receive  prices that guarantee
an income commensurate  with urban wages.  Furthermore, imports and
exports should be  restricted so  that Poland would  become  food  self-
sufficient.  This  policy  produced a highly distorted sector that was  unable
to follow  its natural economic  progression;  that is,  one that would
produce a diminishing  share of GDP with a lower  portion of the
workforce  (agricultural employment  remains extraordinarily high at about
25 percent of the labor force  for an agricultural sector  producing only
about 12 percent of GDP).  Furthermore, these  subsidies  preserved a
sector where many of the  private farms were  of uneconomic  size.
Almost  at the onset  of the reform process,  the agricultural sector  faced  a
new  reality, of market forces  and world prices.  The sector  was  impeded
in adjusting to this new  reality by the size of private farms and by the
physical  conditions of its production: land of only moderate fertility and a
short growing season.  Two  other major impediments  also  hindered
adjustment of the agricultural sector:  the state sector and its control of
food  processing  and inputs and the formidable  external barriers facing  its
agricultural trade.
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In Poland,  as in most countries, the efficiency  and productivity of agro-
industry is as critical to agricultural performance  as good  farm technology
and management.  In Poland, an estimated 75 percent  of food  is
processed,  and almost all agricultural inputs come  from domestic  industry.
Between  these  "upstream"  and "downstream" industries lies agriculture.
Its farmers depend on the efficient  and competitive  operation of food
processing  and distribution for their share of wholesale  food prices.
Farmers also  require high-quality,  low-cost  inputs such as  seeds,  fertilizer,
and other chemicals  from their input suppliers.  Without the efficient
operations of these  industrial sectors,  agriculture is  helpless  and,
investments  in improving  farm productivity are nearly useless.
Agro-industry  in Poland is grossly inefficient  and generally unresponsive
to market forces.  In terms of factor productivity growth,  food  processing
ranked second  to last  in a sample  of 17 industrial groups, with  a decline
in annual growth of 5.1  percent in productivity from 1978 to  1982.  With
the overall  resurgence  in output growth between  1982 and 1985,  food
industry productivity growth became  positive  at 1.2 percent but still
ranked second  to last in growth.  In terms of international comparisons  of
competitiveness  (as measured through domestic  resource  coefficients
(DRC's),  the food  industry displayed  the least international
competitiveness  of all of Poland's industries (table  1).  In fact,  the DRC
measure  for food  processing was  negative,  indicating that the value  of
inputs exceeded  the value of output when  measured  in world  prices.
Furthermore, many processing  plants were  generally  15  years behind in
technology.
This lack of efficiency  shows  up in other measures.  In a  1988  sample of
500 of the largest State-owned  industrial enterprises, about  10 percent
lost  money in the absence  of subsidies and taxes.  Of this 10 percent,
about 90 percent were  in the food  processing  industry.  Of other
industries with  losses,  about 70 percent  supplied agricultural inputs,
animal feeds,  and fertilizer.  While  part of  the losses  is  attributable to
6  The reverse is also  true: agro-industry depends  on the efficiency  of agriculture.  This
fact  also  has broader economywide  implications  because  the food  industry share of all
industrial output is about 20 percent, of convertible exports  13 percent, and of employment
roughly  10 percent.
SThere was considerable  variability of results with the dairy and meat industry being  the
least  competitive  and soft drinks and milling  products being more  competitive.
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1986
Value  Value
Industry  added,  added,  Shortrun  Longrun
domestic  world  prices  DRC's  DRC's
Coefficients
Metallurgical  15,411  5,785  1.15  4.00
Electro-engineering  89,208  70,802  .55  1.32
Chemical  23,581  18,786  .41  1.25
Mineral  8,981  9,177  .49  1.05
Wood and paper  9,226  8,399  .54  1.04
Light  40,601  30,373  .61  .01
Food  6,048  -3,803  -1.47  -3.40
Total  193,226  139,518  .62  1.45
Source:  Konovalov  (1989).
price controls,  a major contributor must also  be  assigned  to the  agro-
industries' inefficiencies  and antiquated technologies.
Beginning  in August  1989, the government  began  to liberalize  prices with
the objective  of allowing  the market to determine which  firms are
efficient and which are not.  The drive for efficiency  through price
liberalization confronted  another barrier, the oligopoly  structure of agro-
industry.
Agro-industry  is highly concentrated, both on an aggregate  level  and on a
regional  level.  For example, in a  1987 sample, two firms had 47 percent
of the market in food  concentrates,  41 percent in oils and fats, 51 percent
in potato products, 30 percent in vegetable  and fruit products, and 30
percent in sugar products (table 2).  In other industries, such as dairying,
milling,  and meat processing,  the two-firm concentration  ratios were
lower  (in the range 2 to 20 percent of the market), but these low
percentages  concealed  the regional oligopsony  nature of the firms.  With
transport difficult  to  obtain and costs  high, single  buyers dominated many
regional  markets.  Also,  there is considerable  possibility of collusive
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Share controlled by--
Industry  One firm  Two firms  Four firms
Percent
Outputs:
Food concentrates  31  47  n.a.
Oils  and fats  .28  41  66
Potato  products  27  n.a.  n.a.
Fruit and vegetable  products  23  31  40
Flour milling  products and pasta  9  14  24
Eggs  and poultry  8  15  28
Milk and milk products  2  n.a.  n.a.
Sugar and sugar products  19  30  51
Inputs:
Tractors  90  96  n.a.
Fertilizer  22  43  73
Farm machinery  15  23  36
Animal feed  14  26  51
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny  Przemyslu,  1988.
n.a.  =  Not  applicable.
behavior  among these  state enterprises.  One of the legacies  of central
planning is  that many enterprise directors and managers are accustomed
to formal and informal economic  coordination.
Despite a dramatic fall in throughput and increasing indebtness  of
enterprises,  few  agro-industrial enterprises have gone  bankrupt and few
have significantly  reduced their labor force.  With  workers'  councils
having the right to select  and fire managers  and the state still the nominal
owner  and thus, eventually,  obligated  to bail out failing  enterprises, no
manager has the incentive  to reduce his or her labor force or close  the
enterprise.  In many ways,  price liberalization has  contributed to the
worst case  scenario: inefficient,  oligopoly,  and oligopsony  enterprises
pricing largely  as they wish  to compensate  for lower  output and not
reducing costs.  The agricultural sector  cannot be healthy while it is
hostage  to such an uncompetitive  and inefficient  agro-industry.
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Several lessons  are applicable to the Soviet Union,  especially  if
consideration is given  to the similarity of the macroeconomic  conditions
of the Soviet  Union in 1990 and with those in Poland in 1989 and the
beginning  of 1990.  In the winter of  1990, Soviet  policymakers  faced a
similar situation as the authorities in Poland found themselves  in the fall
of 1989.  Growth for nearly a decade  had been  slow  or nonexistent.  The
macroeconomy  had deteriorated, with the fiscal  deficit  growing  from
about 2 percent of GDP in 1986 to about 8 percent.  Furthermore,
tremendous inflationary pressures existed.  Broad monetary expansion  had
been at a rate of nearly  15 percent from  1986 while  prices  had barely
increased.  With commodities  scarce and prices  fixed,  this monetary
expansion  put pressure on the supply system  for major cities.  Unsatisfied
demand resulted in accumulation of rubles to possibly  50  percent of
GDP.  This monetary overhang and the increasing  budget deficit  carried
with it the prospects  of hyperinflation.  A worsening  trade deficit  and a
growing external debt complicated  the decisions  that Soviet  policymakers
were facing.  Postponement of dealing with this situation was  only
worsening  the economy.
The lesson  from the Polish experience  in dealing with  macroeconomic
crisis is that hyperinflation under such  circumstances  when  coupled with
highly distorted relative prices will  be inevitable  and even  desirable.  In
turning from  a controlled economy  to a market economy,  relative  prices
must adjust on some items by  more than 1,000  percent (some  by  10,000
percent).  Because  a downward  movement  in relative  prices and nominal
wages  is  nearly impossible  both politically  and economically  given  the
accumulated inflationary pressures,  large movements  in absolute  and
relative prices  are inevitable.  These  movements  will  be dramatic but
ultimately controllable  as they  are largely step  adjustments.  The trick is
matching monetary and fiscal  policies  to the necessary  price adjustment.
If monetary policy  is too tight, then the fall  in output and rise in real
interest rates will  be severe,  as in the case  of Poland.  But if fiscal  policy
is lax,  the initial price adjustment will  feed  upon itself and the overshoot
will  be  large.  If the stabilization comes  while  prices are rigidly controlled,
the accumulated inflationary pressure and the need  for a  relative price
adjustment will  still  exist, waiting the final decontrol  and with it the
strong probably of failure of the stabilization program.
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liberalize  most food  prices, the Soviet's  are considering  whether to
administratively raise prices or to  liberalize them under their stabilization
program.  The  Soviet  authorities fear both the inflation  and the political
reaction to  an uncontrolled  adjustment in prices.  Poland,  before  its
liberalization of food  prices, tried to administratively adjust prices
upward.  But with inflationary pressures already strong, this action  proved
to be  only a  temporary step while  keeping  the government  at the political
center for pressures to reverse price changes.  Full-scale  liberalization,
both economically  and politically,  was  inevitable.
In the Soviet  Union, full-scale  liberalization will  also  be inevitable,
primarily because  it will be the only way  to dissipate the inflationary
pressures from the monetary overhang  and to get relative prices
somewhat  in line.  The key in the Soviet  case  will  to ensure that the
budget deficit  is simultaneously  eliminated while  monetary policy  is  even
somewhat  accommodating  to the price adjustment.
Another lesson  from the Polish  experience  is that price liberalization  will
not induce  an agricultural supply response  in itself either in the very
short term or the longer  term without other steps.  The short-term supply
response  will not be forthcoming  because  of the uncertainty created by
hyperinflation.  Farmers and state farms would rather keep real assets
than money  (especially  if it is not convertible  to hard currency)  in such  an
inflationary environment.  Until the inflation subsides or is  stabilized
even  at relatively high  rates, the supply of even  existing stocks  will  not be
forthcoming.  Thus, policymakers  find themselves  in the worst of all
worlds: higher food  prices without  supplies  to the stores.  Polish
authorities turned to food  aid that eventually  proved  excessive  and
contributed to the collapse  in farmgate prices.  The key lesson  is that
supplies  must be made  available,  and these  need  to be either stocked
from domestic  sources  or imported.  Once  the back of inflation  is broken
and supplies  do  come  forward, then any excess  supplies  must be
reexported  or held in storage.  Food  aid agreements  must allow  for
reexport.
The longer  term supply response will  also  not be forthcoming  if the
monopoly  structure of agro-industry  is not dismantled or deregulated.
Only one  solution ultimately remains: massive  privatization backed with
import competition.  As was  the case  of agriculture in Poland,  if subsidies
to the sector  are also  eliminated with the liberalization,  the sector  will
face  higher input prices  and an oligopsony  structure on its output.  These
prices  increase  on the inputs,  and the lower  output prices caused  by lack
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of the government and resubsidization  will be inevitable.  In the case of
Poland, intervention  was inevitable;  the key was to  design the intervention
in a way that was least obtrusive and least costly.
For political sustainability,  a safety  net is also desirable  and perhaps
necessary.  Poland had not much of a compensation  package  in place
when it began the reform program.  Unemployment,  however, did not
emerge as quickly as expected  because  of the ability of enterprises to
avoid the budget constraints, at least in the short run.  Furthermore,
many Poles held cash reserves in hard currency.which they could use to
buffer the initial price hit on food.  But,  a safety net will eventually  be
needed as unemployment  and real wage cuts become sustained.  The
safety net should ideally be in place before the program  begins, but some
slack time is built in through the lethargy of state enterprises  in ridding
themselves  of workers and through various means of avoiding  nominal
wage restraints.
Finally, the state farms must be dealt with upfront but in as least
disruptive a manner as possible.  In the case  of Poland, the government
decided to avoid the issue of dismantling state farms for as long as
possible.  The government had no way to deal with the excess of
farmworkers,  especially considering  that housing  was not available  in
cities.  Furthermore,  the government feared that production would be
disrupted and the marketed  surplus would disappear.  But, we know that
public farming  does not work.  State farms must be dealt with in a
manner that does not permit the excessive  fragmentation of landholding.
The task force on the Soviet Union made some specific recommendations
that are equally applicable to Poland.  The Polish authorities will need to
deal with the state farm  issue soon or the failure to do so could be added
to the lessons  from the Polish experience.  The government  should ideally
privatize state farms in conjunction with  a privatizing of industry.
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